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UNITED STATES NATIONAL SPACE SECURITY POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR DOD SPACE CONTROL
The United States has been the world leader in space for decades and is second to none in the development of space technology and its uses for industrial, civil, military, and intelligence operations. However, the rest of the world is increasing its reliance on space applications such as navigation, communications, weather prediction, agriculture, and urban planning. The list of how space technology contributes to the world economy grows almost daily. Space globalization is a phenomenon that our National Military Strategy must consider. The National Security Strategy calls for the military to develop capabilities to protect U.S. assets in outer space. This is to ensure the use of space assets during time of conflict. Potential adversaries understand the U.S. reliance on space systems and their vulnerabilities. The U.S. must deny the adversary use of space if called upon to do so and ensure the ability to operate freely.
The space community will increasingly encounter strategic issues as adversaries use third party space assets to enhance their military and intelligence operations. What are the implications for military and national security planners when third party space assets and services are interwoven into our adversary's capabilities? Will current U.S. space policy meet the needs of the nation in an era of space globalization? To answer these questions this paper will review the national and military policies on space. It will also summarize the effects of space globalization, to include the world's increasing reliance on civilian space assets. Finally, a strategic analysis of space control policies and doctrine will determine if there is a sound space strategy in the face of globalization and if not, suggest recommendations for possible action.
NATIONAL AND DOD SPACE POLICY REVIEW
The U.S. National Security Strategy approaches space from the perspective that assets in outer space must be protected. This requires strategic access to space which should be available to all nations, as it is with the global commons of international airspace, open ocean, and cyberspace. 1 Associated with this strategy is the desire to transform our remote sensing, intelligence, and global strike capabilities which would not be possible without space assets. At the same time, our strategy calls for cooperative action with our global partners in terms of regional military alliances and economic policies that will include, "free trade that provides avenues for growth and fosters the diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and opportunity." 2 At face value this makes good sense. However, the two themes of protection of our assets and the promotion of increased opportunity in space for all are not necessarily consistent.
The current National Space Policy, last updated in 1996 with the Clinton administration, recognizes that the U.S. is the world leader in space and must maintain its leadership through a balanced space program, serving our national security, supporting our foreign policy, and stimulating economic growth. "Access to and use of space is central for preserving peace and protecting U.S. national security as well as civil and commercial interests." 3 In June 2002, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive -15 (NSPD-15), asking the National Security Council (NSC) to review the space policy with a focus on commercial remote sensing, and foreign access to these capabilities. If the old policy was not adequate for today's environment, NSPD-15 directed that a new policy be written. 4 Output from the council was due by the end of 2003 but is still pending. It remains to be seen if there will be a significant change in policy. The fact that it has been eight years since a rewrite of the national policy has taken place is significant. A lot has happened in the proliferation of space technologies and capabilities during this period.
The national security space guidelines within the National Space Policy state that the United States will conduct those space activities needed for our national security. Those duties are divided into the Defense Space Sector and the Intelligence Space Sector. The Department of Defense (DoD) shall maintain the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application. 5 "Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries." 6 Likewise, the Director of Central
Intelligence must ensure that the intelligence space sector provides timely information and data to support our diplomatic, defense, and economic activities.
To meet national security objectives, the 2004 National Military Strategy is grounded on the principles of protecting the homeland, preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries. Securing access to space is an integral part of these tasks, as well as essential to maintaining strategic access and global freedom of action. 7 In addition, U.S. military strategy recognizes the global proliferation of dual use technologies available to adversaries.
This includes information technologies, high resolution imagery, and navigation systems. In future conflicts access to low cost technologies such as these will facilitate possible disruptive and destructive actions by state and non-state actors against U.S. forces and interests.
DoD Space Policy states that space is a medium like land, air, and sea. The ability to access and use space is a vital national interest. Space power is a strategic enabler of the National Military Strategy. 8 It enables information superiority through collection, generation, and dissemination. "U.S. space systems are national property afforded the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights." 9 Such an occurrence would warrant, if directed by the President, use of force.
U.S. policy is clearly written, both at the national and military levels. The use of space is vital to preserve peace and promote prosperity. As a world leader the U.S. will take the action necessary to protect space assets, in order to protect vital interests. However, the specifics of how the U.S. will implement space control is left to interpretation. The policy does not say the U.S. will use space weapons. It says the U.S. will develop space control capabilities within treaty guidelines. This subtlety within the documents was probably intentional leaving room for the White House to avoid the issue directly as the DoD implements an aggressive space control strategy. Within the last few years DoD officials have openly talked about the space control strategy and published doctrine on how it will achieve space dominance. 10 Looking at military doctrine will illustrate how the U.S. is implementing its space control policy. How policy is interpreted and put into action provides an insight into the ability to fulfill its intended purpose. provides the option of destroying adversary satellites and space systems. The doctrine of how the military will achieve space dominance is fairly clear. Space weapons will be used to achieve U.S. military objectives. This is not against national policy. As General Lance Lord said in January 2004, "war in space has begun". 13 The unclassified documents and candid public dialogue taking place on the subjects of space control and space weapons are having negative effects on our national image and security. The global space community sees the Americans wanting to dominate and exploit space at the expense of others. This is viewed as space imperialism. It is hard to have good international relations with another space power when they know what will be done to their systems in time of conflict. Some space analysts predict an escalation in space weapons development and employment among the major competitors because of the U.S. space control policy. 14 By providing the public and potential adversaries access to U.S. strategy to conduct space control, the U.S. could be compressing the timelines for adversaries developing cheap and effective space weapons. It is not hard to imagine a competitor thinking that if their space capabilities are going to be neutralized, then they would need to do whatever it takes to destroy the U.S. space capability. The U.S. has much more to lose with its greater reliance on space systems. With a satellite dish they could monitor the news and the world situation. They were providing interviews to third party news agencies broadcasting via a global space network. 18 Terrestrial connections to satellite nodes also provide potential adversaries access to global internet and phone services.
SPACE CONTROL POLICY IN ACTION
Third party space systems are of particular concern to U.S. space planners and operators. This is a good example of the conflict between policy and the realities of executing that policy.
Commanders are severely limited in their ability to negate enemy use of space unless they have the time to request approval through the chain of command. The process is very timely. Space control operations at the tactical level inherently have strategic implications.
The conflict between the direction to maintain and deny access at the same time is amplified with space globalization. The U.S. military, as well as the rest of the world, is relying on commercial space assets to disseminate information. DoD space policy addresses cooperation among the intelligence, civil, and commercial sectors to help expand capabilities to focus funding on the appropriate priorities. This means that commercial assets are to be used as much as possible to achieve economies not possible with the current U.S. military space acquisition practices. 20 This includes both communications bandwidth and imagery. However, the U.S. is not the only one buying services. It is very possible for the DoD to contract the same services and assets allies and adversaries might use. If you deny one party, do you run the risk of denying yourself? A range of diplomatic and technical dilemmas develop quickly. The rapid growth of space globalization has made U.S. space policy difficult to implement. An understanding of space globalization is required in order to determine if current U.S. policy is serving the nation's interests.
SPACE GLOBALIZATION
The United States and the rest of the world is growing more reliant on space. Because of this, U.S. policy-makers must think of space as an integration of available commercial, national, civil, and multinational space assets. 21 The days of the American-Soviet bipolar national domination of space are over. Despite the U.S. current status as the world leader, the rest of the space-faring world is catching up. As a result, the U.S. must not only think of military threats, but of the economic and diplomatic threats it faces from foreign space systems.
Most countries in the world use a variety of space services to ensure redundant capabilities within their civil, defense, and industrial sectors. India is one example of the support for multinational space services. They have invested in both the Russian GLONAS and European Union's Galileo navigation systems. Multipolar space systems are one way to ensure a robust access to space. 22 Assured access to space means money continues to flow through the economy; the military operates at peak efficiency; and political influence can be levied as
needed. 27 The growing investment in commercial satellite communications from the DoD and other international customers is fueling investments in increased capacity. In the case of satellite communications the trend in globalization has helped the U.S. military through its insatiable demand for bandwidth. However, the U.S. is not the only one relying on the systems mentioned above.
Therein lies the potential conflict in controlling access to satellite communications. The U.S. is using the same systems that it might want to deny access to by others. Usually, there will be many international users of a single satellite, multiplied many times through the system constellation.
Access to commercial imagery is what most people think of in terms of a threat to our National Security. In 1986 the French Satellite Probatoire pour l'Observation de la Te rre (SPOT) system became the first commercial imagery system to provide products for a fee. 28 The U.S. commercial system IKONOS became the first one-meter resolution provider in 1996. 29 Russia, India, China, and Japan currently have their own space imaging capability. Turkey, South Africa, and the six nation Gulf Cooperation Council are in the process of developing their own assets to be operational by the end of the decade. 30 Where once America was the sole power in space imagery, global economic needs in urban planning, agriculture, mapping, and telecommunications have resulted in the proliferation of commercial space imaging technology to the rest of the world.
Technology is making access to space imagers easier. Internet services now allow remote purchasing, tasking, and receipt of products. One current example is the Israeli built, Cyprus based ImageSat Corporation satellite. This system allows a customer to directly task a satellite camera and download the image in complete secrecy. Even the company does not know who does the buying or what was bought. 31 Space systems like these which are easy to use at a reasonable cost will attract many customers, hostile or friendly.
The prevention of this type of space access is problematic for U.S. policy. U.S. policy is to control access, but currently there is no U.S. version of "shutter control" through diplomatic means. Shutter control is a policy the government can use to shut down or limit the areas of collection provided by U.S. licensed imagery companies, in the interests of national security.
This is implemented by the Secretary of Commerce after coordination with the Secretary of
Defense and Secretary of State. 32 Disagreements between the cabinet members are resolved by the President. If a combatant commander were to consider shutter control actions, he must be aware of the political and economic implications of such a request. To date, shutter control has never been implemented in the U.S. Even if it were to be considered in future events, it only applies to U.S. licensed companies. Foreign space imagery providers are not affected by U.S. policy and can sell their products to anyone.
At best U.S. policy-makers might try to encourage a type of international shutter control through a diplomatic engagement of a country providing space services to an adversary. This takes political capital and friendly relations with the third party country. The situation is complex and requires specific intelligence on who is doing the buying and where they are conducting their operation. It is easy to think that Iranian intelligence will pick up the phone in Tehran and place their order for overnight delivery from a commercial vendor, but more than likely an individual placed in a strategic location will buy something in a third party country and disseminate the product using any number of wideband communication services. The U.S. Overall, what the nation needs is to be consistent with the current policy. Freedom of action in space is required. This meets the requirement for America to be secure while maintaining global leadership and promoting economic growth abroad. It is more a question of how the policy will be implemented. U.S. military doctrine clearly states what will be done to achieve space dominance. However, is this strategy the best course of action for the nation?
Focusing on the national security implications of space control, U.S. military and national security policy-makers must come to agreement on the ways and means of the stated objectives.
WAYS
Julian Corbett, an early 20 th century English maritime strategist whose theories on combined land-sea operations are still applicable today, had a good analogy. It relates to the use of the seas. Does the Navy want to command the seas or just secure right of passage?
Corbett argued that the seas are so vast that a ship has many routes to accomplish its task. 34 In those days you could only find a ship by getting within visual distance. Now there are a variety of remote sensing capabilities to find large objects on any point on the earth, but still to this day it is difficult to find a particular ship among the thousands. The same can be said of space. Is it U.S. policy to command space or be able to secure U.S. passage? As written, the National Space Policy is one of securing passage, however, the U.S. military strategy to implement that policy is one of command. 35 When planning for a regional conflict the military commander wants to command that air and space above the operation. That means controlling who operates within that space and taking offensive action against anything that can affect friendly military operations. The U.S. military space control strategy is also heavily oriented towards denial rather than prevention. This seems to be happening because prevention is becoming too hard to execute in the face of space globalization. Technology is proliferating to the point where users of laptops with internet access can access commercial space assets.
The military has chosen the path of space weapons and technical domination because hard power is becoming the only feasible option to control space.
Washington's clearly stated policy is to protect and defend access to space. Access to and use of space is central for preserving peace and protecting U.S. national security, as well as civil and commercial interests. Within the policies there are a range of options to deal with threats, from diplomatic to military. Maybe the future emphasis should be on the diplomatic and economic power space provides. If space became a free market zone and the regulations on the proliferation of certain technologies were lifted, the U.S. space industry might be able to expand current market share. U.S. satellite manufacturing accounted for $18.3 billion (22%) of total commercial space revenue in 2000. 36 Is this going to grow as competition with the European consortiums increases? Probably not with the current policy that limits export of critical space technologies.
In the case of commercial remote sensing, the U.S. policy is to encourage the competitive stance of industry to compete in the international environment. The government will rely on commercial assets to satisfy its needs and provide an agreeable licensing environment for exports of remote sensing products and space systems. 37 However, the bureaucracy of licensing and the requirement for national security sometimes run contrary to U.S. industry's ability to compete on the international scene. A recent example is the French government's future dual-use Pleiades high-resolution optical imaging satellites, to be built by EADS Astrium and Alcatel Space. In September 2004, the French government decided it was not worth limiting system capability to that of America's list of satellite technologies requiring special export licenses. 38 The Pleiades .7 meter resolution imaging system will have a dual military and commercial mission, and will not contain any U.S. manufactured parts. Export regulations and policies like shutter control affect the U.S. market, but the international community is developing its own national or multinational space systems. Washington's ability to control high resolution remote sensing data is quickly eroding as new international systems are deployed.
I would argue that if U.S. market share decreases, the threats to national security increase. Likewise, if U.S. market share increases, the threats decrease proportionally. The U.S. policy of controlling critical space technologies is limiting the abilities of U.S. manufacturers to invest in research and development, as the cash is flowing to foreign competitors. Foreign manufacturers are increasing their parts quality, reliability, and overall system capabilities. This is to the detriment of the U.S. space industrial base and overall national security as U.S.
manufacturers slowly lose their technical dominance to a rapidly spreading global space industry.
Diplomatically, the strength of the U.S. space industry is needed to provide an opportunity for America to increase its soft power with the rest of the developing world. With the ability to provide struggling and growing democratic nations the access to space services, the U.S. may help them develop a vibrant economy. This would be a strong diplomatic tool. More importantly, it meets a U.S. strategic objective of maintaining world leadership in technology and enhances the nation's overall economic well being. Will other nations fill this gap for the developing world as U.S. policy limits its ability to maintain technological dominance?
The U.S. National Space Policy must address this issue. Will the U.S. rely on technical domination, which implies a sort of unilateral approach to protecting our own interests? The recent declines in U.S. space manufacturing indicate that trying to protect critical technologies in order to maintain technical domination are having serious consequences for the future of the U.S. space industry. 39 Or will a multilateral approach be pursued with the other space-faring nations to assure freedom of action in space for all? This might provide the U.S. manufacturers the business needed to maintain their dominance while at the same time providing the government the ability to execute space diplomacy and exercise a greater degree of soft power. 40 
MEANS
Is the U.S. space community organized for success? A major issue is the imbalance of importance placed on space between the national policy side of the government and the military. Space wings, squadrons, and teams are deployed globally at the ready to respond and support the combatant commanders. There are also a significant number of space officers assigned to the Joint Staff and all the Service Staffs within the Pentagon. During OIF alone there were over 600 space personnel deployed in theater. 41 The National Science and Technology Council is the forum for national space policy. Unfortunately, the lack of staff support has left space issues to be dealt with in a crisis mode only. 42 The The financial means to maintain leadership in space will be challenged as the global war on terror continues to draw funding away from R&D budgets. The U.S. will always do what it takes on a unilateral basis to protect national interests, but with the growing costs to maintain global leadership in space America might find itself seeking more multilateral space programs.
The American history of multilaterism is long and successful. shrinking. America will always strive to keep ahead, but strategic planning at the national level must continue to think of diplomatic and economic means of controlling space when needed.
The technical means to overcome some of these concerns in U.S. military space strategy depends significantly on the current DoD transformation efforts. 45 The DoD is seeking to enhance the survivability of its space systems in order to support communications requirements and weapons systems that rely on positioning and timing data. It is fair to say that there can be no global net-centric-warfare capability without space. The rest of the world is also becoming more reliant on space technologies and getting smarter on the inherent vulnerabilities. Electrooptical surveillance, jamming devices, lasers, micro-satellites, and launch services are available to anyone with the funding. For this reason, the current military strategy to dominate space by offensive and defensive means will create a competition among space powers. If the U.S. is to stay ahead of the competition it must speed up space transformation efforts with the funding to match. arrange itself to meet the national security needs of the twenty-first century. 46 This called for an investment in people. To date only the military has taken aggressive action to meet this requirement. Washington needs the national security apparatus to do the same in order to achieve a balanced approach to space policy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
America's national and military policies for space are clear. The U.S. is relying on space to secure its national interests. Freedom of action in space must be maintained to meet the nation's diplomatic, military, and economic needs. Space superiority is achieved through a balanced program of investments in science and technology. As U.S. capabilities grow, so do those of the rest of the world. With this growing dependence comes a proliferation of space technology that makes access for future adversaries increasingly easier. U.S. civil, military, and commercial systems also become more vulnerable.
The current space policies and strategies do not adequately address the international realities of space. Washington wants to control access to space, but it is getting harder to do so when all the nations of the world are clamoring to use commercial space services that are available from multinational corporations and consortiums. The world's growing reliance on space is making it harder to track the users of its systems and services. The current U.S.
strategy for dealing with space access is predominately a military option. The DoD is organizing itself to execute a space control strategy. However, the national security policy-makers have no equivalent structure to ensure diplomatic and economic measures are considered. This has created strategic issues for DoD space planners and operators, in the face of technology proliferation, that will create policy dilemmas during a future crisis.
The National Space Policy needs to more accurately reflect the global trends in space utilization. As written, it meets the needs of the nation. However, the strategy to implement the policy is flawed. This highlights the pressing requirement for leadership within the national security space structure to address the growing national interests in space. Warfare has changed throughout history in the mediums of land, sea, and air with new technology. There is now the emergence of space warfare, in existence since the competition with the Soviets started in the late 1950's. America's military space capabilities will continue to be needed, but it must never lose sight of the opportunities to expand diplomatic space power to help deter future conflict, as well as promote global economic growth.
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